So, for example, my neighbor and I cannot disagree about the proper location of the fence that will divide our properties without sharing a whole collection of concepts and judgments that set the terms of the dispute. If it turns out that he does not know what fences are for, then our disagreement is more apparent than real. If the specific judgments that give substance to his concept “property,” are substantially different from mine, then it is not disagreement that divides us, but confusion. Disputes about just distributions, exchanges, and relations will proceed in the same way. They will presuppose basic agreement about “justice,” about the specific judgments that give the concept substance and the specific examples that identify its proper use. To those who wonder whether this agreement in judgment and use actually obtains Aquinas has little to say. He can point out that the desire to render each the good that each is due by right can be found in all human communities and he can remind us that we could neither recognize this fact, share this desire without finding considerable overlap between our account of justice, with its specific material content, and every other. But this is not much of a reply. It is, rather, an invitation to go and look.