Such is the way we live now. At the same time, we should keep in mind that this dynamic reaches beyond tolerance to justice, its home and principle, and while we might, in some instances, lament the dynamic, few of us resent this virtue. Those of us with ordinary measures of justice built into our souls surely dodge its difficulties more often than we should. We reduce judgments about the just and the unjust to calculations of utility. We sidestep rights and downplay wrongs, and yet few regard justice with contempt simply because of its instability among the morally imperfect. Why then regard tolerance differently? If lament we must, then we should consider how few of us respond as the tolerant do to the objectionable differences that give us the most difficulty, that cause us the most pain when endured. At the same time, we can5t take this lament to a fever pitch without resenting the virtue and discounting its excellence. What we can decry is philosophers who encourage complaints and critics who provoke resentment simply because they overlook how tolerance stands among the other moral virtues and how the virtues in general stand among various difficulties.