Of course, it may well be the case that many who act among the tolerant, ° replicate their patient endurance but not their just intention, in fact hope to secure the ends of the tolerant principally for themselves, just as it is certainly the case that many of those who admire and defend mutual tolerance assume that this self-regarding intention exhausts the disposition and justifies our resort to its act.13 But why should we think that an account of what most of us do and intend as we act among the virtuous tracks the truth about virtue? If, by definition, a virtue is a habit that resides in a power of the soul and perfects its acts, and if perfection involves acting at the limit of that power for the sake of some good and in spite of some difficulty, then it should come as no surprise when Aristotle notes that action at this limit is rare and the truly virtuous few.14foot13 That acts of toleration appear in response to fear and self-interest should hardly surprise. For an example of their appearance in early modern Europe, see Hill, ”Toleration in Seventeenth-Century England.” Nor should we discount the possibility that these actions actually deliver what is due, that they track the right, even as they fall short of true virtue, of right endurance done for the sake of tolerant ends. One can always do the right thing for reasons that fall short of the right.