On this rendering, the instrumental aspect of the virtue’s goodness seems easy enough to make out. The tolerant endure the objectionable differences of another in order to maintain the society they share, the peace that abides between them, and the autonomy each enjoys with respect to the differences in dispute. The tolerant conclude that these ends are worth having, that they have a certain intrinsic goodness of their own, and that they can be had in this particular instance by resorting to this particular act. By habit, the tolerant tend toward these rightly ordered relations when confronted with these particular differences. No doubt, the tolerant will bring benefit to themselves as these ends are achieved and these goods had. After all, when a just act achieves just ends it sets a relationship right, and a rightly ordered relationship is a common good, one that is shared and enjoyed in common by those who participate in the relationship. But to say that tolerance belongs to justice is to say that the tolerant intend to achieve these ends, to enjoy this common good, not only for themselves but also and principally for the neighbor who is the source of the difference in dispute.