Still, it is worth noting that both the morally flabby and the resentful critic make the same mistake, and here we see its source. Both succumb to the difficulty associated with the moral specification of toleration’s act, and, as a result, both collapse true tolerance into one of its semblances, the one to justify an injustice, the other to denounce the virtue defended in that justification. As is the case with every other virtue that involves operations, true tolerance is difficult to distinguish from its semblances precisely because its principal action—patient endurance of objectionable difference—is, at least at first, in-different morally speaking. Fixing that act in its moral species—ordering it to an end and nesting it in a collection of circumstances—is a challenge the tolerant address well. With wise counsel and sound judgment, it is a task they complete with the ease of habit. For the rest of us, it’s a trap that we either avoid with hard work that replaces virtue’s ease, or stumble into despite our best efforts. And it is precisely because tolerance regards the difficulties associated with specifying the moral substance of its act that deceptions and manipulations so frequently and so easily confound our account of the virtue, our resort to its patient endurance, and our assessment of its merit.