Qualified complaint with justice remains quite common. Consider Marx’s critique. What Marx resents is not the concept per se, but rather its deployment as an ideology in social conflicts and our failure to see that its material content derives from the function it plays in a given mode of production. His treatment of the “so-called rights of man” in “On the Jewish Question” follows this pattern. (See Tucker, ed., Marx-Engels Reader. For commentary, see Wood, “Marxian Critique of Justice.”) Or consider those who champion self-esteem as a primary goal of upbringing and education. They don^ say that they resent justice, but they do describe countless acts of warranted criticism and just grading as cruel or harsh. They want us to replace the question of what criticism is just and due with the question of what remarks are likely to build up self-worth. And finally there is Stanley Hauerwas’s infamous, hyperbolic, and often misunderstood insistence that justice is a bad idea. Set After Christendom^ For clarifications, see \2iitvyN2iS, Performing the Faith, 215-241.1 owe this qualification to Melissa Lane.