Problems of asset specificity and monitoring are countered by setting up, through the servicerelationship, incentives to persuade employees to act in the employer’s interest. Theseincentives must align the interests of the two parties, and this is done by establishing a link‘between employees’ commitment to and effective pursuit of organizational goals and theircareer success and lifetime material well-being’ (Goldthorpe 2000, p. 220). To secure this,prospective elements in the employment contract play a major role: ‘for example, salaryincrements on an established scale, assurances of security ... pension rights ... and ... welldefined career opportunities’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, p. 42). As far as monitoringdifficulties are concerned this solution is one which is familiar in the game theory literature:the temptation to defect and gather a short-term gain is offset by the prospect of extended andlong term payoffs as a reward for cooperation.