Our study contributes to the current literature in several ways.First, prior research has identified negative effects of additional informationon the JDM of auditors; for instance, in the form ofinformation overload or dilution effects that distract auditors fromdiagnostic informational cues (Hackenbrack, 1992; Shelton, 1999).However, only very limited research has investigated the influenceof information provided by auditors themselves. We locate such “realeffects” of the KAM reporting requirement on auditors' JDM ofaccounting estimates. The context of accounting estimates is especiallypertinent as ISA 701.9(b) requests the consideration of accountingestimates with high uncertainty when deciding on which KAM toreport. By isolating the disclosure requirement, our unique experimentalsetting allows statements on how the reporting of KAMs can beanticipated by auditors while evaluating the respective accountingestimate and thus influence auditors' JDM on the preparers' side.