Social Capital in the Creation<br>of Human Capital'<br>James S. Coleman<br>University of Chicago<br>In this paper, the concept of social capital is introduced and illustrated, its forms are described, the social structural conditions<br>under which it arises are examined, and it is used in an analysis ol<br>dropouts from high school. Use of the concept of social capital is<br>part of a general theoretical strategy discussed in the paper: taking<br>rational action as a starting point but rejecting the extreme individualistic premises that often accompany it. The conception of social<br>capital as a resource for action is one way of introducing social<br>structure into the rational action paradigm. Three forms of social capital are examined: obligations and expectations, information<br>channels, and social norms. The role of closure in the social structure in facilitating the first and third of these forms of social capital<br>is described. An analysis of the effect of the lack of social capital<br>available to high school sophomores on dropping out of school before graduation is carried out. The effect of social capital within the<br>family and in the community outside the family is examined.<br>There are two broad intellectual streams in the description and explanation of social action. One, characteristic of the work of most sociologists,<br>sees the actor as socialized and action as governed by social norms, rules,<br>and obligations. The principal virtues of this intellectual stream lie in its<br>ability to describe action in social context and to explain the way action is<br>shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social context.<br>The other intellectual stream, characteristic of the work of most economists, sees the actor as having goals independently arrived at, as acting<br>independently, and as wholly self-interested. Its principal virtue lies in<br>having a principle of action, that of maximizing utility. This principle of<br>action, together with a single empirical generalization (declining marginal<br>utility) has generated the extensive growth of neoclassical economic the1 I thank Mark Granovetter, Susan Shapiro, and Christopher Winship for criticisms of<br>an earlier draft, which aided greatly in revision. Requests for reprints should be sent to<br>James S. Coleman, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois<br>60637.<br>? 1988 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.<br>0002-9602/89/9407-0010$1.50<br>AJS Volume 94 Supplement S95-S120 S95 <br>American Journal of Sociology<br>ory, as well as the growth of political philosophy of several varieties:<br>utilitarianism, contractarianism, and natural rights.2<br>In earlier works (Coleman 1986a, 1986b), I have argued for and engaged in the development of a theoretical orientation in sociology that<br>includes components from both these intellectual streams. It accepts the<br>principle of rational or purposive action and attempts to show how that<br>principle, in conjunction with particular social contexts, can account not<br>only for the actions of individuals in pa
正在翻譯中..