The moral reflectiveness that genuine autonomy assumes, reflectiveness about the merit of the various ends we intend and means we chose, is something that one acquires and exercises in the company of others, in response to their challenges and counterclaims. Moreover,one can’t intend to lead this or that life, pursuing this or that collection of ends, apart from a shared social context that makes certain pursuits possible and that provides for choice among them. It follows that if I am truly tolerant, then I will want this autonomy for my son with my son. I will want to partake of this good with him. He can’t have it without sharing it with me and I can’t want it for him without desiring it, as least indirectly, for myself. So it is with common goods and so it is that tolerance works.If patient endurance of his difference is in fact a good that I owe my son in this instance, and if it’s a certain measure of autonomy’s reflectiveness that I hope to achieve with this act, then I need to do various things to deliver what I owe and achieve what I hope. And notice how these efforts and obligations emerge from our relationship and its roles, to the fact that he is my son and I am his father and that we share a certain sort of life together.