Yet I think he could have. He concedes that the one, divine good that charity regards is ''related to God in one way, and to our neighbor in another” and that as a result “charity must have diverse modes for its primary and secondary objects,5 [habeat diversum modum) {DC 4.5). This difference in mode with respect to charity’s good follows from the fact that the neighbor must be loved as neighbor even as she is loved propter Deum, a fact that forbearance puts on sharp display. After all, it is the neighbor's objectionable differences that are endured in love, not God‘s, and this places her in a different relation to charity’s good. She will not be loved as God is, not exactly, not with precisely the same act or for the sake of the same proximate ends, and forbearance compels us to take note of this difference. It brings the neighbor into focus as a distinct object of love, as a creature different from God who nevertheless belongs to God, whose objectionable differences call forth an act of love that can be offered for God’s sake but never directly to God. Here the crucial point comes into view.