This failure and this concession are, in this Augustinian context, motivated by a desire to mark Christian difference and secure Christian commitment, but these gains are ill gotten. If the difference between true tolerance and its semblances comes into focus after just a little reflection, and if most of us, “pagan” and Christian alike, can grasp the difference on the slightest provocation, then Tinders complaint, his resentment, and his specification of Christian difference all fall flat. And note, his efforts turn on our ability to see how he draws this distinction and on his assumption that we can5t ordinarily draw it, or at the very least that we typically don5t. Either way, he assumes that most of us have unwittingly reduced tolerance to a species of moral nihilism and that most will dismiss the virtue once sound criticism brings us to our senses.80 It’s an unconvincing collection of assumptions, and it casts doubt on his effort to show that “pagan” virtues are as different from their Christian cousins as evil is from good. Certainly, the virtues that Christians praise and that help perfect their lives and relationships will be distinct in some way. They will be situated in social relationships that include the God of Israel as a middle term, and their acts will be ordained to love’s union with God and neighbor. This much, at least, Christians will confess. And yet the various relations that obtain between these virtues and their “pagan”, counterparts are likely to be more complicated, and more interesting, than Tinder imagines.