Even if the statute's basic aim is to ban D&X, its language makes clear that it also covers a much broader category of procedures. The language does not track the medical differences between D&X and D&X—though it would have been a simple matter, for example, to provide an exception for the performance of D & E and other abortion procedures. Nor does the statute anywhere suggest that its application turns on whether a portion of the fetus' body is drawn into the vagina as part of a process to extract an intact fetus after collapsing the head as opposed to a process that would dismember the fetus. The plain language covers both procedures. A rereading of this opinion will make clear why we can find no difference, in terms of this statute, between the D & X procedure as described and the D & E procedure as it might be performed. Both procedures can involve the introduction of a “substantial portion” of a still living fetus, through the cervix, into the vagina—the very feature of an abortion as involving “partial birth.”