Bankrupt business firms distribute

Bankrupt business firms distribute property to low-priority investors even though the firms do not fully repay high-priority investors.That bankruptcy in this way alterscontractuaI priorlties effectively reallocates among investors the risk of business insolvency. Commenlators have roundly criticized such reallocation as an impediment to efficient business practice. Recently, however，a "risk-sharing defense of bankruptcy reallocation has appeared in both the law4 and finance liferature. Risk-sharing theorists argue that all investors in a business debtor- equity investors and creditors alike-would choose to share the risk of loss from the debtor's insolvency. These theorists surmise that investors cannot agree to share such risk, because a risk-sharing agreement is prohibitively expensive to nepotiate. Therefore, the theorists cooclude,bankruptcy reaiiocation furnishes a mutually beneficial hypothetical bargain to which investors would expressly agree but for transaction difficulties.

結果 (中文) 1:

破产企业到低优先级投资者的财产分配，即使企业不完全偿还高优先级投资者。那在这种方式 alterscontractuaI priorlties 破产有效投资者地重新分配企业破产的风险。Commenlators 有批评这种重新分配作为高效的业务实践的一个障碍。最近，然而，"破产重新分配风险分担防御出现在 law4 和财务的昭示。风险分担的理论家认为，所有在业务的债务人股权投资者投资者和债权人-会选择分享从债务人的破产损失的风险。这些理论家推测，投资者不能同意分享这种风险，因为风险分担协议是昂贵到 nepotiate。因此，理论家 cooclude，破产 reaiiocation 提供了互惠互利的假设讨价还价到哪个投资者会明确同意但交易困难。

結果 (中文) 2:

破产的商业公司财产分配低优先级的投资者，即使企业不完全偿还高优先级investors.That破产这样投资者alterscontractuaI priorlties有效地重新分配企业破产的风险。Commenlators已经饱受批评，例如重新分配为妨碍有效的商业行为。然而，最近的破产再分配的“风险分担防守已经出现在这两个law4和金融寻根文学，风险分担理论家认为，在一个企业的债务人所有投资者股权投资者和债权人的一致好评，会选择共享亏损的风险从债务人破产。这些理论家推测，投资者不能同意分享这种风险，因为风险分担协议是惊人，以nepotiate昂贵。因此，理论家cooclude，

結果 (中文) 3:

破产企业的财产分配优先级低的投资者，即使公司不完全偿还高优先级的投资者。这样alterscontractuai priorlties破产有效再分配投资者风险企业破产。commenlators已经严厉批评这种再分配作为有效的业务实践的障碍。最近，然而，“风险分担破产分配的防御已经出现在两law4金融文学。风险分担理论家认为，所有的投资者在一个企业的债务人-股票投资者和债权人都会选择分担的风险，从债务人的破产。这些理论家认为投资者不能同意这样的风险，因为风险分担协议是nepotiate昂贵。因此，理论界cooclude，破产reaiiocation提供互惠互利的假想交易的投资者会明确同意但成交困难。