These differences emerge most vividly in comparison with natural tolerance. Consider, first, the distinct range of operation exhibited by charity’s forbearance. On Thomas’s rendering, it requires a sanum rationis iudicum, a “sound judgment of reason” in accord with our gracious participation in God’s eternal law {ST IMI.33.3.2; cf. 45.2), and of course ordinary tolerance demands something quite similar. By habit, the tolerant intend to deliver the good that is due to the person from whom they are divided by some objectionable difference, some unsettling disagreement. And they cannot choose aright among those acts that might deliver this due, those things that we listed at the start of chapter 4—endurance, acceptance, respect, indifference, contest, correction, coercion, expulsion, or exit—unless they ''counsel, judge, and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it” {ST I-II.58.4).