This stems from the fact that the territory of shop dt1 is defined on the basis of a reasonable estimate of the
customer pick-up cost; however, the customer, aside from the value he places on his own time, will tend to
prefer the closest of the areas served by the two logistic nodes if he lives in the area formed by their
intersection.
Analogous considerations made for each area served will thus lead to a determination of the territories for
each shop, as well as any overlapping of the areas served by different distribution points.
Finally, it is worth considering that the organizational alternative of home delivery of products ordered by
customers can be adopted in the scenarios outlined thus far only on condition that the fixed costs be
eliminated for the intermediate logistical distribution network that permits the other type of delivery to be
offered on the market. However, this radical choice may place all those customers whose shop product
pick-up cost (Ppc) is low in a position of economic imbalance, as illustrated in Figure 7. In the contrary
case, if the intermediate logistical points (shops or distribution points) scattered throughout the territory and
their associated fixed costs are not eliminated, interest in home delivery would be further eroded (there
would be a shift towards the upper end of the cost curve in an amount equal to the sum of the fixed costs
for the shops kept open). Therefore, the decision to eliminate the intermediate logistical structure cannot be
made without a careful analysis of the costs incurred by current and potential customers to pick up ordered
products from shops. This decision, which can lead to a veritable “e-commerce trap” if taken rashly, is
complicated by the fact that the fixed costs for shops generally do not permit gradual entry.
Figure 7. The e-commerce trap
Case1: Alternative organizational solutions (network of shops or home delivery)