It follows that the person who is truly tolerant is distinguished, at least in part, by her habitual willingness to endure the right sorts of objectionable differences for the sake of the peaceful society and individual autonomy that she shares with others, and she intends to secure these goods and that society by this act for herself (no doubt) but principally for those with whom she shares this society. She intends to secure this good for the person she tolerates, which implies, as we have said, that the truly tolerant person acts justly. She endures the objectionable difference of some other in order to secure for them the common good that is their due, in this instance the society she shares with the one who offends, the peace that sustains what they share, and the autonomy that abides among members across this particular difference. And presumably, she could not act in this way for the sake of these ends, if she did not participate in that society of shared goods and common loves from the start and if she did not hold that society dear. When it is threatened by difference and disagreement, she tolerates those who offend, at least in part, because the shared society counts more than the offense. It is this peaceful sociality with them that she wants, and she tolerates their objectionable differences in order to secure this good for them and with them.17