The empirical literature on corporate governance is so extensive that it is a dauntingtask to provide a comprehensive survey in a single article Fortunately, a number ofsurveys of specific issues have appeared recently We shall to a large extent relyon these surveys and only cover the salient points in this section In the introductionwe have defined five different approaches to resolving collective action problemsamong dispersed shareholders: (i) hostile takeovers; (ii) large investors; (iii) boardsof directors; (iv) CEO incentive schemes; and (v) fiduciary duties and shareholdersuits Each of these approaches has been examined extensively and recent surveyshave appeared on takeovers lBurkart ( 1999)l, the role of boards lRomano ( 1996),Hermalin and Weisbach ( 2003)l, shareholder activism lBlack ( 1998), Gillan andStarks ( 1998), Karpoff ( 1998), Romano ( 2001)l, CEO compensation lCore, Guay andLarcker ( 2003), Bebchuk, Fried and Walker ( 2002), Gugler ( 2001), Perry and Zenner( 2000), Loewenstein ( 2000), Abowd and Kaplan ( 1999), Murphy ( 1999)l and largeshareholders lShort ( 1994), Gugler ( 2001), Holderness ( 2003)l Not even thesesurveys cover everything In particular, research on the role of large investors is notfully surveyed partly because research in this area has been rapidly evolving in recentyears The literature on fiduciary duties and shareholder suits is very limited.