Our study contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, prior research has identified negative effects of additional information on the JDM of auditors; for instance, in the form of information overload or dilution effects that distract auditors from diagnostic informational cues (Hackenbrack, 1992; Shelton, 1999). However, only very limited research has investigated the influence of information provided by auditors themselves. We locate such “realeffects” of the KAM reporting requirement on auditors' JDM of accounting estimates. The context of accounting estimates is especially pertinent as ISA 701.9(b) requests the consideration of accounting estimates with high uncertainty when deciding on which KAM to report. By isolating the disclosure requirement, our unique experimental setting allows statements on how the reporting of KAMs can be anticipated by auditors while evaluating the respective accountingestimate and thus influence auditors' JDM on the preparers' side.