And finally, given the conclusions of this chapter, how is it that some societies recognize tolerance and encourage its cultivation, while others apparently do not? If our nature disposes us to make use of the concept, to find goodness in the act, and to acquire the virtue, then why is tolerance cultivated and praised in some times and places but not all? And this puzzle about distribution becomes all the more puzzling when it is Thomas's account of justice and its parts that we use to locate tolerance among the virtues. Thomas agrees that acts of toleration can be good. In some circumstances and with respect to some ends, its patient endurance can be due another; it can be a requirement of the relationship in which it is exercised. But he does not identify a virtue that perfects resort to this act. He does not theorize tolerance. He does not list it among the potential parts of justice. The same applies to love’s endurance, to forbearance. He assigns it to charity as one of its works, but he says nothing at all about its origin in a virtue of its own. It is to these questions and puzzles that we now turn.