Spain. To this end, we use as the dependent variable Thomson Datastream price changes of these
countries’ 10-year government bonds.
When analysing abnormal returns on the portfolios of bank equity we use the return on the
FTSEurofirst 300 index as the market index. When analysing the impact on sovereign bond prices we
use as the market index the J.P. Morgan Index of European Government Bonds with yields to maturity
between 7 and 10 years. We express the returns on bank portfolios, government bonds, and stock and
bond price indices in excess of the risk-free rate, for which we take the one-day EONIA interest rate.
4. Results
4.1. Main results
Table 3reports the abnormal returns associated with news about Greece and news about the bailout
of Greece. They are obtained as the coefficient estimates from regressing the time series of daily
portfolio returns during 2010 on the news variables (as well as on a constant and the market index
discussed above). Thefirst row in the table shows that both news about the economic situation of
Greece and news about a potential bailout of Greece have a significant impact on the equity value of
Greek banks. The impact of news about Greece is significant only at the ten-percent level, but this
partially reflects the small sample size (the portfolio comprises only four banks and thus has relatively
high variance).
The second row in the table presents results for the full sample of banks. Twofindings stand out.
First, news about the economic situation of Greece does not have a significant impact on the market
value of the equity portfolio containing all banks in the sample. Second, news about the bailout of
Greece does significantly affect the market value of this portfolio. A one percent change in the Greek
government bond price induced by news about a bailout on average leads to a 0.12 percent change in
banks’ market value.
Thefirst finding for the full sample of banks implies that expectations byfinancial markets
regarding losses for banks do not change when the probability of a Greek default changes due to news
about Greece’s economic situation. This includes losses expected from direct exposures to Greece, but
also losses expected from for instance indirect exposures via other banks. This result suggests that
market participants do not expect bank losses associated with an actual Greek default to be large.
The secondfinding implies that the prospect of a bailout has a stabilising impact on all banks’ stock
prices. When Greek bonds rise in value due to positive news about a bailout, bank stock prices rise as
well. Apparently,financial markets attach substantial value to the willingness of governments to shield
banks from losses on their sovereign exposures by bailing out failing euro countries.
To examine the impact of news about Greece and news about a Greek bailout in more detail, the
next two rows in the table distinguish banks with an exposure to Greece from banks without an
Spain. To this end, we use as the dependent variable Thomson Datastream price changes of these
countries’ 10-year government bonds.
When analysing abnormal returns on the portfolios of bank equity we use the return on the
FTSEurofirst 300 index as the market index. When analysing the impact on sovereign bond prices we
use as the market index the J.P. Morgan Index of European Government Bonds with yields to maturity
between 7 and 10 years. We express the returns on bank portfolios, government bonds, and stock and
bond price indices in excess of the risk-free rate, for which we take the one-day EONIA interest rate.
4. Results
4.1. Main results
Table 3reports the abnormal returns associated with news about Greece and news about the bailout
of Greece. They are obtained as the coefficient estimates from regressing the time series of daily
portfolio returns during 2010 on the news variables (as well as on a constant and the market index
discussed above). Thefirst row in the table shows that both news about the economic situation of
Greece and news about a potential bailout of Greece have a significant impact on the equity value of
Greek banks. The impact of news about Greece is significant only at the ten-percent level, but this
partially reflects the small sample size (the portfolio comprises only four banks and thus has relatively
high variance).
The second row in the table presents results for the full sample of banks. Twofindings stand out.
First, news about the economic situation of Greece does not have a significant impact on the market
value of the equity portfolio containing all banks in the sample. Second, news about the bailout of
Greece does significantly affect the market value of this portfolio. A one percent change in the Greek
government bond price induced by news about a bailout on average leads to a 0.12 percent change in
banks’ market value.
Thefirst finding for the full sample of banks implies that expectations byfinancial markets
regarding losses for banks do not change when the probability of a Greek default changes due to news
about Greece’s economic situation. This includes losses expected from direct exposures to Greece, but
also losses expected from for instance indirect exposures via other banks. This result suggests that
market participants do not expect bank losses associated with an actual Greek default to be large.
The secondfinding implies that the prospect of a bailout has a stabilising impact on all banks’ stock
prices. When Greek bonds rise in value due to positive news about a bailout, bank stock prices rise as
well. Apparently,financial markets attach substantial value to the willingness of governments to shield
banks from losses on their sovereign exposures by bailing out failing euro countries.
To examine the impact of news about Greece and news about a Greek bailout in more detail, the
next two rows in the table distinguish banks with an exposure to Greece from banks without an
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