This strategy, while profitable in the short run, exposes the Turkish banks to significant and predictable exchange risk. It will work only so long as the Turkish central bank is able to maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate in the face of high domestic inflation. In the process of doing so, the Turkish lira's real value will rise, putting pressure on exporters (who will see their goods priced out of world markets) and companies competing against imports. According to purchasing power parity, higher Turkish inflation will eventually lead to lira devaluation. If and when this happens, Turkish banks will find themselves facing a much higher lira cost of servicing their foreign debts. In fact, the Turkish lira did devalue, by 28% (in April, 1994), forcing a number of Turkish banks to the point of bankruptcy. The squeeze on Turkish banks was exacerbated when depositors, jittery over the banks' problems, began to withdraw cash. The Turkish central bank was forced to step to help guarantee banks' liquidity and calm depositors' nerves.