Presumably Aquinas means that its object is unsuitable to right reason, to our better judgment, and presumably it is because the object specified by right reason comes loaded with moral content in sufficient measure that we are able to consider theft evil in its species. Thieving is not just taking what another has, for of course, not all takings involve theft. Borrowing, repossessing, reclaiming, taxing, and so on are certainly takings, but they are not equivalent to thieving, at least not always. Thieving, by contrast, always involves taking what rightfully belongs to another, and thus by definition—by the kind of act that it is as specified by its object— theft is always evil, always unjust, always a violation of right. One cannot steal without violating this right, without doing this harm, and these facts specify the moral reality of the act even when it is done for the sake of an end that is itself just and good.Notice what follows. While theft is unjust in its species, taking what another has is not. This does not mean that borrowing, repossessing, reclaiming, taxing, and so on can’t be unjust, that they can^ be theft, but rather that sometimes they are and sometimes they aren’t.